The paper investigates the role of energy prices in reducing energy intensity in Chinese industry. For the short run, the paper estimates contemporaneous energy price elasticities; for the long run, the paper examines in the impact of energy prices on energy-saving investment. A central purpose of the paper is to identify those subsets of China's industrial rms that are the largest energy consumers and likely to be the most price responsive. Analyzing a unique panel data set which reports rm-level energy consumption and price, the paper shows three stylized facts: (i) real energy prices, which are regulated by government, are typically lowest for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), followed by domestic non-SOEs, and highest for foreign-funded rms. (ii) In descending order of energy intensity, the six most energy-intensive industries are: electricity and power generation, petroleum processing and coking, coal mining, chemical products, nonmetal products, and nonferrous metal products. Also these six industries face relatively lower energy prices than the rest of mining and manufacturing industries. (iii) In the short run, SOEs tend to be somewhat less responsiveness than their domestic non-SOE counterparts and foreign-funded rms. However, over the long-run, SOEs tend to be more responsive to rising energy prices by investing in new energy-ecient capital; the same priceinvestment channels are less robust for non-SOEs or foreign-funded rms. Last, in a DSGE model with a combination of putty-clay and putty-putty investment, the share of output produced by putty-clay investment is estimated through indirect inference. An economy with 69.8% of output produced by putty-clay investment is able to reproduce the energy price elasticities estimated directly from the rm-level data. The model also shows that a 10% increase in energy price will lead to a 3.1% decrease in energy intensity, which is associated with a 1.1% drop in output and a 4.2% drop in energy consumption.
1 Introduction price-investment channels work for SOEs, lowering SOEs' investment costs and nancing costs could also be an eective policy. The absence of similar incentive for non-state and foreign enterprises may explain the relative unresponsiveness to investment in response to higher energy prices.
These new ndings are highly relevant to China's environmental and energy policy. In November 2014, China and U.S.
signed an agreement on climate change, in which Chinese government agreed that its CO 2 emissions will peak on or prior Accordingly, during the 12th Five Year Plan , the Top-1000 Enterprise Program was extended to the 10,000 most energy intensive industrial rms. As Chinese government pays more attention to environmental issues, this targeting program intends to extend to and cover all industrial rms. All these policy initiatives underscore the question of how China can signicantly reduce its energy intensity most eciently so as to curtail climate change.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data set and summarizes several facts on the heterogeneity of energy intensity and prices, as well as energy pricing for Chinese industrial rms. In Section 3, estimation models are introduced and endogeneity issue of rm-level energy prices is addressed; short-run and long-run price elasticities are estimated for the whole sample and individual industrial sectors. Section 4 provides a brief description of estimating a DSGE model, which is used to quantitatively evaluate the impact of energy price on aggregate variables. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Heterogeneity in Energy Intensity and Energy Price
The purpose of analysis in this section is to identify the relatively homogeneous sub samples that lie along an extremely heterogeneous continuum of energy intensity and prices across industries, regions, and ownership types. This exercise enables us to know which groupings of industrial rms have the greatest potential for reducing energy intensity using the energy price instrument.
Data set
The rm-level data used in this paper are a subset of the Large and Medium-size Enterprises (LME) data set collected by China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) from year 1997 to 2004. It provides nancial and economic variables as well as energy consumption variables. Specically, the energy data includes the amount of consumption, value of purchase and quantity of purchase for 21 energy types.
The sample used in this analysis is an unbalanced panel, consisting of approximately 35,000 rms. I clean the data set and exclude outliers by the following criteria. First, observations whose key nancial variables (such as total assets, net value of xed assets, sales, and gross value of industrial output) are missing are dropped. Second, observations whose prole variables have inconsistent number of digits (i.e., the region code should be 6 digits, the ownership code should be 3 3 digits, and the industrial code should be 4 digits) are dropped. Further, I delete observations according to the basic rules of generally accepted accounting principles if any of the following are true: (1) liquid assets are higher than total assets; (2) total xed assets are larger than total assets; (3) the net value of xed assets is larger than total assets; (4) the rm's identication number is missing. Last, both energy intensity and energy price, the two key variables this paper focuses, exhibit extremely large values. These unreasonably large values might be due to mis-reporting or measurement errors. Therefore, the observations with largest 1% value of energy intensity and energy price are trimmed o.
Two key variables of interest, energy intensity and real energy price, are constructed in the following way. First, energy intensity is constructed as the ratio of overall energy consumption to the real output. Real output corresponds to the variable gross value of industrial output (GVIO) at constant price level. Overall energy consumption is measured as physical quantity as tones of standard coal equivalence (SCE). Firms report their amount of consumption, value of purchase and quantity of purchase for 21 energy types. NBS weights the individual energy types to provide a measure of overall energy consumption. The weights are rm-specic adoption coecients for those 21 energy types. Second, real energy price is constructed as the nominal energy price divided by the output price; both prices are at rm-level. The nominal energy price is calculated as the total value of purchase for 21 energy types divided by the total quantity of purchase, which is sum over 21 energy types. Each energy type is converted to standard coal equivalence by the adoption coecients provided by NBS. 1 Output price is calculated as GVIO at current price level divided by GVIO at constant price level, which are both provided by NBS.
Energy intensity
This subsection presents some facts regarding heterogeneity in energy intensity, which is our measure of energy eciency.
As described in Section 2.1, energy intensity is the ratio of overall energy consumption to real output.
Energy intensity by 3 ownership types
In the sample, 50% of the rms are SOEs, 38% are domestic non-SOEs and the rest 12% are foreign-funded rms, a classication that combines rms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) and foreign rms. Table 1 presents the mean and median energy intensity across those 3 ownership types. On average, SOEs have the highest energy intensity, then non-SOEs, and foreign-funded rms have the lowest energy intensity. 2
Energy intensity by 8 industrial sectors
From the perspective of industry, among the 38 (manufacturing and mining) industries in the sample, the electricity and power generation industry is the most energy intensive, followed by the petroleum processing and coking industry. This is due to the fact that these two industries use considerable amounts of energy as inputs. Power generation consumes a large amount of coal as its input to generate electricity, and petroleum processing and coking industry uses crude oil intensively to produce various type of rened oil. Mining industries have higher energy intensity than manufacturing industries. Among mining industries, coal mining and coking industry is the most intensive . Among manufacturing industries, the chemical intensive than non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms. Both mean and median energy intensity of SOEs are higher than that of non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms. Foreign-funded rms are the least energy-intensive, although in some years, the average energy intensity of foreignfunded rms is higher than of non-SOEs, its median energy intensity is always lower. Those summary statistics can be found at https: //sites.google.com/site/sarahletang0610/research-1.
4 products, nonmetal products and nonferrous metal products are more energy intensive than the rest of manufacturing industries. Table 2 represents the mean and median energy intensity in 8 groups: electricity and power generation (elect), petroleum processing and coking (petro), coal mining, nonferrous metal products (iron), nonmetal products (cement), as electricity and power generation, petroleum processing and coking or coal mining, which are also energy intensive.
To see whether energy intensity depends more on ownership categories or industries, I pick up a specic 4-digit level industry in each of four 2-digit level industries: electricity and power generation, chemical products, nonmetal products, and nonferrous metal products. The corresponding 4-digit level industries are: thermal power generation, nitrogen fertilizer, cement, and steel pressing. These 4-digit level industries are used to identify the role of ownership in dierentiating rm's energy intensity. The upper Panel A in Table 4 shows the results of regressing energy intensity on rm's ownership dummies, controlling for the year and province eect 4 in thermal power generation, nitrogen fertilizer, cement and steel pressing, respectively. These results show that even at the 4-digit level industry, ownership still matters;
SOEs have higher energy intensity than non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms.
In sum, the above analysis shows that: 1. SOEs are the most energy-intensive, then domestic non-SOEs, and foreignfunded rms are the least energy-intensive; 2. from the industry perspective, the electricity and power generation industry is the most energy-consuming industry, followed by the petroleum processing and coking industry, then coal mining, chemical products, nonmetal products, and nonferrous metal products ; 3. from the perspective of geographic locations, northern and northeastern provinces are more energy-intensive than eastern and southern provinces.
3 I also look at the six industries' energy intensity year by year. It shows that these six industries, electricity and power generation, petroleum processing and coking, chemical products, nonmetal products, nonferrous metal products and coal mining industry, are consistently more energyintensive than the rest of mining and manufacturing industries. Those summary statistics can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/ sarahletang0610/research-1. This subsection presents facts regarding the heterogeneity in real energy prices, which are constructed as the nominal energy price divided by the output price; both prices are at rm-level. The construction of real energy prices are described in subsection 2.1.
Setting energy prices: institutions and practice
After the price reform in 1994, China's dual-track pricing system was abolished, the price of energy was increasingly driven by the market forces. However, government intervention in energy price still exists. In Chinese industry, rm-level energy prices dier in terms of ownership category, industry and regional location. State-owned enterprises have been given favorable treatment or subsidies reected in the low energy prices . Energy-consuming industries have been given lower energy prices by government, whose intention is to keep the production cost low in order to make those industries competitive in international markets. Provincial governments also play an important role in setting energy prices due to the imbalanced economic development across regions, such provinces like Guangdong, Zhejiang and Shanghai in eastern areas with relatively high GDP, the energy prices are relatively higher than Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, the inner areas with less economic development. In the sample, the average shares of coal, oil and electricity consumption of an individual rm are 64%, 9% and 20% correspondingly. Coal, oil and electricity are dominate among 21 types of energy. Therefore, in the following subsection, I focus on the price setting institutions for coal, oil and electricity respectively.
Coal pricing
The price of coal has been intentionally kept low by the government. The low coal price is due to the fact that on one hand China is resource abundant with coal, 13% of the world's total coal reserves are in China (IEA, 2014) , and most of the coal is near the surface of the ground, so the extraction cost is relatively low. On the other hand, the majority of coal is sold to the thermal power sector. In the sample, about 40% of China's coal production was consumed by the thermal power plants. And the power generation sector is heavily subsidized by government, whose intention is to keep the price of electricity low for industrial production and in particular for the state-owned enterprises and the energy-intensive industrial sectors.
Before 1983, the price of coal was tightly controlled by the government, since coal is regarded as a strategic resource.
In 1983, a dual-track price system was introduced; one price was set by government agencies, notably the State Planning Commission (SPC), the predecessor of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), for plan-allocated quotas, and the other price was set by the market. Beginning in 1993, coal price liberalization was initially experimented with in eastern China and then introduced to the rest of the country (Wu, 2003) . By 1996, coal prices were largely deregulated except for certain industries, which are chemical products, cement, iron and steel, and electricity and power suppliers (Li, 2007) . However, the NDRC still recommends both power generation plants and coal companies to negotiate a long-term contract, in order to stabilize the price of coal.
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Oil pricing
Before 1998, the price of oil was under tight regulation by the government. Although the dual-track price system was introduced in 1994, due to the dramatic change in oil prices driven by market force, oil price were still regulated by the government, whose purpose is to avoid oil price volatility. With the increasing dependence of import oil, China imported 6.6% of its oil in 1990, and rose to 30% in 1997, in June 1998, the government started to set domestic oil prices in accord with global oil prices (Hang and Tu, 2007) . Specically, the SPC adjusted domestic oil prices when the change in the Singaporean oil spot market price was more than 5%. Starting in 2001, the domestic oil price was pegged to a weighted average price of Amsterdam, Singapore and New York oil spot market. 5 Since then, China's domestic oil price has been based on international market price and adjusted monthly. Moreover, the SPC also sets the regional prices of rened oil products according to the international oil price. Hence, since 1998, oil prices in China have been largely driven by international market prices.
Electricity pricing
Compared to coal and oil, whose consumption are more concentrated in certain industries, e.g., 40% of coal is consumed by electricity and power generation industry, 20% of oil is consumed by petroleum processing and coking industry, the consumption of electricity is less concentrated among industries.
The price setting scheme for electricity can be decomposed into two steps: rst power generation plants sell electricity to grid companies, who are in charge of power distribution and transmission; and the next step is grid companies selling electricity to end-users, either industries or residents. The rst step price is referred as to the wholesale price, and the latter one is referred as the retail price. Until now, both wholesale and retail electricity prices have been tightly regulated.
The wholesale price is set by local governments, usually at the provincial level by the provincial pricing bureau, and with nal approval from the central government's State Pricing Bureau under the SPC. The regulated prices are based on the power generator's age, fuel type(coal, hydro-power, nuclear power and etc), location and type of power generated Due to regional dierences in economic development, it is dicult to implement a unied pricing system because poorer provinces may not be able to aord a higher electricity price. Besides some provinces have special endowment or resourceabundance, such as Guizhou or Sichuan have abundant hydro power, and Shanxi have abundant coal resources. Such resource-endowment dierences among provinces are reected in electricity prices across provinces.
The retail price for electricity is set according to a catalogue system prepared by the SPC pricing bureau. It serves as a means of giving preferential treatment to heavy industry, chemical plants, agriculture and irrigation, in terms of both the allocation and price of electricity . The catalogue forms the basis of end user taris through China. Each of the categories is assigned a catalogue price, which is used by the provincial pricing bureaus to calculate the nal price (IEA, 2006) . Due to the regional dierences in economic development, each province and major municipality amends the uncatalogued price set by the State Pricing Bureau to suit its own policy goals and economic development, and may add a dierent suite of additional fees to the nationally approved ones. Therefore, the electricity prices vary considerably across dierent regions.
5 See http://www.in-en.com/finance/html/energy_1606160612586545.html.
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In short, although market force started to play a role since the phase-out of dual-track price system in the mid-1990s in energy market, energy prices are still under both central and local government's supervision (USITC, 2007; Rosen and Houser, 2007) , because the government has considered energy as a strategic resources and fundamental to the country's economy (Li, 2007; Hang and Tu, 2007; Wu, 2003) . Therefore, through an extensive, somewhat decentralized system of the regulation of coal, oil and electricity prices, energy prices for industrial rms are largely regulated by the government. 
Energy price by 3 ownership types

Energy prices by 8 industry sectors
From the perspective of industry, rms in electricity and power generation industry consistently pay the lowest energy price from 1997-2004, followed by rms in petroleum processing and coking industry. Mining industries face lower price than manufacturing industries. Among mining industries, coal mining and coking industry, which is the most energy intensive mining industry, faces lower price than other mining industries. In manufacturing industries, the most energyintensive industries, such as chemical products, nonmetal products and nonferrous metal products, face lower prices than other mining and manufacturing industries. Table 6 respectively. Again, the electricity and power generation industry and petroleum processing and coking industry stand out, which face the lowest energy price. The low energy price in electricity and power generation industry is mainly due to government subsidies, because high electricity price would undermine the competitiveness of manufacturing industries.
Historically, coal was sold to the power generation sector at subsidized prices, sometimes at half, or even less than half of the production cost (Lam, 2005) .
6 Because the lower bound of energy price is zero, the distribution of energy price is highly skewed to the left. To make the price distribution more symmetric, logarithm of energy price is used. 8
Energy prices by 5 regions
Regarding geographic locations, Table 7 presents the summary energy prices by the 5 regions: north, northeast, east, south and west. Overall, energy prices in the north and northeast are lower than that in the south and east. This is due to the imbalanced resource endowment across provinces. Take coal for instance, most of the coal reserves are in the As mentioned in before, rm's ownership categories, industries and regions are somehow correlated, and geographic regions are more exogenous than ownership and industry categories. In order to see whether energy price depends more on ownership categories or industries, four specic 4-digit level industries: thermal power generation, nitrogen fertilizer, cement and steel pressing, are selected to compare their energy prices among 3 ownership categories. The lower Panel B
of Table 4 shows the results of regressing energy price on rm's ownership dummies, controlling year and provincial eect 7
in the four 4-digit level industries respectively. Those regression results suggest that at 4-digit level industry, ownership does not matter as much as it does in energy intensity. The coecients in front of ownership dummies are not signicant in thermal power and steel pressing, and slightly signicantly positive, at 10 % level, in nitrogen fertilizer and cement.
In sum, the analysis in this section shows that: 1. SOEs pay the lowest energy prices, then domestic non-SOEs, and foreign-funded rms pay the highest energy prices. 2. From the perspective of industry, the two most energy intensive industries, electricity and power generation and petroleum processing and coking, face the lowest energy price, followed by chemical products, nonmetal products and nonferrous metal products. 3. From the perspective of geographic location, the northern and northeastern provinces have relatively lower energy prices than that in the eastern and southern provinces.
2.3.6 Price changes over time The above discussions suggest that the although dual-track system was abolished in mid-1990s and market force was then introduced and started to play a role in determining energy prices, the governments still have certain control over rm's energy prices. From the perspective of price movement, annual average energy price is largely driven by market force and macroeconomic conditions, while the deviation of individual rm's energy price to the annual average is largely determined by the government's regulation and energy price policy. The analysis in subsections 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4
indicates that government assigns energy prices to rms according to their ownership categories, industries and provinces.
Energy Demand Price Elasticity
In this section, I estimate the energy price elasticities using the rm-level data. There are two sets of price elasticities:
short-run price elasticity that measures the contemporaneous impact of energy price on energy intensity, and the long-run price elasticity that captures the dynamic impact of price on energy intensity. First, the energy demand equation is derived from rm's cost-minimization problem; the endogeneity of energy price is resolved by using an aggregated energy price, which is the average price at 3-digit industry and provincial level. Later on, short-run price elasticities are estimated for the full sample and individual industrial sectors respectively; and long-run price elasticities are estimated via a distributed lag model.
Estimation equations
I follow Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) to construct the energy demand equation, which is derived from the rm's cost minimization problem. Assuming a constant-return to scale Cobb-Douglas cost function, 11 the functional form is as follows:
where Q is the quantity of output, P K is the price of capital input, P L is the price of labor, P E is the price of energy input, and P M is the price of intermediate material. The coecient α X is the elasticity of output
A is the productivity term dened as 12
From Shepherd's lemma, the energy intensity equation is: 10 The international oil price is the average of average spot price of Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate, equally weighed. 11 Here I assume Cobb-Douglas cost function, instead of translog cost function, which exhibits more exibility, because of data availability.
Rental price of capital and price of material are not available in the sample.
12 In the rest of analysis, the regional dummies are all at provincial level, not the 5 regional groups dened in subsection 2.2.3.
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where
Substituting for A dened in equation (2) and taking logarithms on both sides, the estimation equation is obtained as following:
where Z it includes rm's ownership, industry and province dummies,
On the other hand, the energy price setting equation is:
It is reasonable to assume that E(u it v it ) = 0. Since Z it represents rm's characteristics, such as ownership category, industry and location, which can be treated as exogenous, so it is reasonable to assume that
The equation (6) is motivated by the institutions of energy price setting in Chinese industries. As discussed in Section 2.3, market force started to play a role in determining energy prices in the mid-1990s, nevertheless the government still have controls on energy prices. Specically the central and local governments assign energy prices according to rm's ownership categories, industries and geographic locations. In equation (6), the year dummies intend to capture the movement of annual average energy prices, which is driven by market force; rm's characteristic variable Z it intends to capture the deviation of individual rm's energy price to its annual average, which reects the energy price setting policy that rms energy price is assigned in according to their ownership categories, industries and provinces. Therefore, rm-level energy price can be modeled as equation (6).
The system of two equations (5) and (6) exhibits the recursive form, essentially the energy intensity Ln( E Q ) does not appear on the right-hand side of equation (6). The recursive form of the system enables us to consistently estimate energy demand elasticity α 1 by focusing on the demand equation (5) alone. 13 Further to address the endogeneity of rm-level energy prices, I construct an aggregated energy price, which is calculated as the average energy price at the 3-digit industrial and provincial level. The following regression analysis uses this aggregated energy price.
3.2
Estimation of short-run price elasticity
This subsection estimates contemporaneous price elasticities. The price elasticity of SOEs is signicantly smaller than their non-domestic counterparts and foreign-funded rms. Specically, a 10% increase in energy price leads to a contem-13 Estimation of equation (6) shows that year dummies and Z it together explains about 65-70% variation of energy price. Regarding industry dummies, I try 2-digit level industry dummies, 3-digit and 4-digit level industry dummies. I also applied equation (6) to both unbalanced and balanced sample. For unbalanced sample, the year dummies and rm's characteristics explain 65-70% of variations in energy price; for balanced sample, the explanatory power of year dummies and rm's characteristics goes to 70-75%. For both unbalanced and balanced sample, the regressions with 2-digit level industry dummies have relatively lower R-square 65%, and those with 4-digit level industry dummies have the highest R-square 75%. Besides the rm's characteristic dummies Z it , I also add other regressors that capture rm's characteristics, such as rm's scale dummy, aliation dummy, and several rm-level specic variables, such as rm's capital-labor ratio, exporting dummy, and energy combinations, which are consumption shares of coal, oil and electricity. Including energy combinations increase the R-square from 65% to 75%, however other variables rarely increase the R-square in equation (6). The results are available from the author.
poraneous 4.5% decrease in energy intensity for SOEs, and a 4.8% decrease for non-SOEs, and 5.2% for foreign-funded rms.
The short-run price elasticity is estimated for the full sample and 8 industrial sectors, which are the six energy-intensive industries: electricity and power generation (elect), petroleum processing and coking (petro), chemical products ( In order to compare the responsiveness to energy price among SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms, the short-run price is estimated by modifying equation (5) as follows:
where N onSOE is a dummy variable for domestic non-SOEs, and F oreign is a dummy variable for foreign-funded rms.
The control variables include year, industry and province dummies and their interactions with N onSOE and F oreign.
The reference rms are SOEs, whose price elasticity is β 1 . β 2 captures the dierences in price elasticities between SOEs and non-SOEs, and β 3 captures the dierences in price elasticities between SOEs and foreign-funded rms. Table 8 and Table 9 report the three key coecients, β 1 , β 2 and β 3 , for the full sample and 8 industrial sectors. 14 The energy prices used in the regressions are average energy prices at 3-digit industrial and provincial level. Table 8 consists of the OLS estimations, and Table 9 are xed eect estimations, which controls for the rm's unobservable xed eects. For both OLS and xed eects, the price elasticities for SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms are consistently signicantly negative for all the sub groups. In general, SOEs' price elasticity is signicantly smaller in magnitude, in comparison with the non-SOEs or foreign-funded rms.
A possible explanation why SOEs are less responsive than non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms might be that the government interferes with SOEs energy prices, such as giving SOEs preferential treatment. Besides price interference, the government interferes with SOEs' decision makings, imposing some social objectives on SOEs. Historically, the SOEs had to shoulder the social responsibility of creating employment, and providing employees with various kinds of fringe benets and service facilities like housing, education and medical care (Lam, 2005) . The work of Cooper et al. (2010) quantitatively veried that SOEs usually pay higher severance fee than than non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms, suggesting that SOEs undertake more social objective, especially in employment creation and stabilization. Another explanation is that SOEs production technology is more likely to be putty-clay, which means there is no substitutability among capital, labor and energy once investment has been installed, while non-SOEs and foreign-funded rm's production technologies are more putty-putty, which means capital, labor and energy are substitutable after investment has been installed. 15 As robustness check, I re-do the regression in equation (7) using the rm-level energy prices and the 4-digit industrial and provincial level average energy prices. With rm-level price or alternative aggregate energy price, the price elasticities for SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms are consistently signicantly negative for all sub samples. And SOEs' price elasticity remains signicantly smaller in magnitude, in comparison with non-SOEs or foreign-funded rms. 1617
Estimation of long-run elasticity
This subsection estimates the long-run eect of price on energy intensity. The long-run price elasticities tend to become more equal among SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms. In particular, over the long-run, SOEs tend to be more responsive to rising energy prices by investing in new physical capital to improve their energy eciency, while similar investment responsiveness does not hold for non-SOEs or foreign-funded rms.
The long-term price elasticity is estimated by including lagged energy prices into energy intensity equation. The long-run elasticity is estimated as follows:
where the control variables include year dummies, rm's ownership, industry and province dummies. The lagged energy price terms intend to capture the dynamic eect of price on energy intensity. Equation (8) is estimated by three sub samples: SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms separately, and the results are reported in Table 10 . The left panel of Table 10 corresponds to the estimation results for SOEs, the middle panel corresponds to non-SOEs, and the right panel is for foreign-funded rms. Longer lagged price terms were added, however they are not reported due to their coecients are insignicant.
The coecients in Table 10 are all signicantly negative. The contemporaneous impact of energy price on energy intensity is larger than that of lagged energy prices, for all SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms. Table 11 reports the cumulative impact of energy prices for SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms respectively.
The cumulative eect for SOEs is calculated based on the result in column (4) of Table 10 , and non-SOEs are based on column (8) of Table 10 , and foreign-funded rms are from column (11) of Table 10 . 10% increase in energy price over 5 years will lead to 9.37% decrease in energy intensity for SOEs, 10.43% for non-SOEs, and 1% increase in energy price over 4 consecutive years will decrease energy intensity by 7.74% for foreign-funded rms. Those cumulative eect for SOEs, domestic non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms are also graphed in Figure 4 .
As robustness check, I re-estimate equation (8) using the rm-level energy prices and the average energy prices at the 4-digit industrial and provincial level. These two sets of regression results share the similar pattern as that shown in Table   10 . 18 Next, I investigate through what channel rms can decrease its energy intensity in the long-run. One hypothesis is that when facing high energy price, rms have incentive to invest in energy-ecient capital, which in turn reduces energy intensity. To test this hypothesis, I apply the following two-step estimations:
16 The regression results can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/sarahletang0610/research-1 17 Due to a large increase in energy price in 2004, I also re-do the regression in equation (7) 18
The regression results can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/sarahletang0610/research-1 13 where Lag Ln(
, which is the moving average of lagged energy prices.
In the rst step, besides the current and lagged moving-averaged energy prices, the ratio of net value of xed assets (NVFA) to original value of xed assets (OVFA) also enters into the energy intensity equation as shown in equation (9).
In the second step, the ratio of NVFA to OVFA responds to the moving average of lag energy prices, as shown in equation (10). The ratio of NVFA to OVFA serves as a proxy that characterize vintage structure of physical capital. The older a rm's capital structure, the lower NVFA relative to OVFA, and vice versa. Under the assumption that new investment takes one year to be productive, current energy price does not enter into equation (10). Here I use moving average of lagged energy prices, instead of individual lagged energy prices, in order to keep parsimony of the estimation equations , and smooth out short-term uctuation. Table 12 reports the estimation results of equation (9), which shows how vintage structure aecting energy intensity. In Table 12 , equation (9) was estimated by 3 sub samples individually: SOEs, non-SOEs and foreign-funded rms. Current and lagged energy prices are consistently signicantly negative in all regressions. Only SOEs and non-SOEs use new investment as an instrument to reduce its energy intensity, while foreign-funded rms do not reduce energy intensity through new investment. The negative coecient in front of NVFA to OVFA means that rms with higher ratio of NVFA to OVFA tend to be more energy ecient. This suggests the SOEs and/or non-SOEs reduce their energy intensity by investing new capital that is relatively more energy ecient. Table 13 reports the estimation results of equation (10), which shows how vintage structure responding to lag energy prices. The ratio NVFA to OVFA of SOEs responds to the lagged energy prices, high energy prices in the past encourage SOEs to make more new investment, which leads to higher ratio of NVFA to OVFA. For non-SOEs , their new investment responds to lagged energy prices to some degree, while the ratio of NVFA to OVFA for foreign-funded rms does not respond to lagged energy prices. That the responsiveness of SOEs' vintage structure to energy price might due to the fact that SOEs get subsidies from the government when energy prices are relatively higher, and SOEs are less nancially constrained, compared to non-SOEs or foreign-funded rms. The less responsiveness of new investment to past energy prices for non-SOEs might be due to the fact that non-SOEs are more nancially constrained, compared to SOEs. Higher energy price means less prot, which tightens their cash-ow constraint.
The two step regressions show that in the long-run, rising energy price will induce rms to invest in energy ecient capital, especially for SOEs. This indicates that lowering rms' investment cost and nancing cost could be a useful The two companies were two leading iron and steel producers in China. In the voluntary agreement, the two companies promised to reach a total energy saving target of 300,000 ton sce in 3 years. In order to reach their voluntary agreement targets, both companies released more investment on energy eciency technical renovation, and in exchange the two companies have access to low-interest loans (Hu, 2007; Price et al., 2002) . The policy instrument that providing or helping rms getting access to low-interest loan, which will be used in energy-eciency investment, has been adopted in the Top-1000 Enterprise Program in 2005. The ndings in the paper suggest that providing low-interest loan or lowering rm's nancial cost, especially in making energy-ecient investment, tend to be an eective policy instrument for rms to achieving energy eciency.
4 Extension
The estimations of energy price elasticities in Section 3 raise two interesting questions: (1) why energy intensity is not as elastic to energy price as anticipated by the Cobb-Douglas production? (2) What are the eects of increasing energy prices on aggregate variables such as energy use and output? If there is a 10% increase in energy price, how will energy usage and output change as a result of price increase? Those cannot be answered by previous regression analysis.
To answer the above two questions, 19 I propose a two-sector model with 3 inputs: capital, labor and energy. In the rst sector, the ex ante production technology is of the Cobb-Douglas form, but for installed capital goods, production possibilities take the Leontief form: there is no substitutability of capital, labor and energy ex post. 20 In the second sector, the production technology takes the Cobb-Douglas form both ex ante and ex post. I refer to the rst sector as the putty-clay investment model, and the second sector as a putty-putty investment model.
With the calibrated parameters in preference, production and energy price process , the two models are solved and simulated. In the putty-clay model, the price elasticity is relatively low, around 0.076, while in the putty-putty model, the price elasticity is nearly unity. In order to reproduce the price elasticities 0.365, which are directly estimated from the rm-level data, a combination of putty-clay and putty-putty investment is needed.
Through indirect inference, we estimate that an economy in which 69.8% 21 of output is produced by the putty-clay investment while the 30.2% balance is produced by putty-putty investment can reproduce the low price elasticity of 0.345, which is close to 0.365, as observed from the actual data. The comparison between the two-sector model and the data is represented in Table 14 . The two-sector model successfully reproduces the contemporaneous impact of energy price on its intensity, and the impacts of lagged energy prices are in the right direction. Based on the estimated share of 69.8%, the 2-sector model predicts a 1.1% drop in output and 4.2% drop in energy usage when there is a 10% increase in energy price. Figure 5 and Table 15 show the percentage deviations of output, energy usage and energy intensity in response to a 10% increase in energy price. 22
Conclusions
The paper investigates the role of energy prices in reducing energy intensity in Chinese industry. For the short run, the paper estimates contemporaneous energy price elasticities; for the long run, the paper examines in the impact of energy prices on energy-saving investment. A DSGE model, which intends to reproduce the energy price elasticities observed from the rm-level data, is used to quantitatively evaluate the impact of energy price on aggregate variables.
Analyzing a unique panel data set which reports rm-level energy consumption and price, the paper shows: (i) real energy prices, which are regulated by government, are typically lowest for SOEs, followed by domestic non-SOEs, and highest for foreign-funded rms.
(ii) In descending order of energy intensity, the six most energy-intensive industries are: electricity and power generation, petroleum processing and coking, coal mining, chemical products, nonmetal products, and nonferrous metal products. Also these six industries face relatively lower energy prices than the rest of mining and manufacturing industries. (iii) In the short-run, SOEs tend to be somewhat less responsiveness than their domestic non-SOE counterparts and foreign-funded rms. However, over the long-run, SOEs tend to be more responsive to rising energy prices by investing in new energy-ecient physical capital, which in turn improves their energy eciency, while the price-investment channels does not appear to operate for non-SOEs or foreign-funded rms.
Moreover, in a DSGE model with a combination of putty-clay and putty-putty investment, an economy with 69.8%
of output produced putty-clay investment is able to reproduce the energy price elasticity estimated directly from the rm-level data. This output share is estimated through indirect inference. This two-sector model predicts that a 1.1%
drop in output and a 4.2% drop in energy usage in response to a 10% increase in energy price.
The ndings show that energy price plays an important role in achieving energy eciency. Since the government exercises certain control over energy prices, a feasible policy instrument for reducing energy intensity would be to increase energy prices, especially for those energy-intensive industries. In the long-run, rising energy prices will induce rms to invest in energy-ecient capital, especially for SOEs. Thus, lowering rms' investment costs and nancing costs could be a useful policy instrument. This policy instrument has been applied to the Top-1000 Enterprise Program started in 2005. In this program, the most energy-intensive rms have voluntarily reduced their energy intensity, in exchange for low-interest loan for energy-ecient investment. To the extent that SOEs are favored with such investment incentives, the ndings in the paper suggest this tends to be an eective policy instrument for rms in achieving energy eciency. The absence of similar incentive for non-state and foreign enterprises may explain their relative unresponsiveness to investing in response to higher energy prices.
In this paper, I focus on the impact of price of overall energy, which is a combination of 21 energy types. A natural extension of this research is to break the overall energy into more detailed energy types, such as coal, oil, and electricity, and to investigate the eect of changes in relative coal, oil and electricity prices on energy consumption and intensity.
Another extension is to collect and analyze available data regarding China's energy consumption and price after 2004, to see whether the movement of energy prices and energy intensities in Chinese industry appear to be largely consistent with the results of this paper, which focuses on the years 1997-2004.
6 Tables Note: the unit is ton sce/ 1000 RMB output at constant price. N stands for the number of rms. Note: the unit is ton sce/ 1000 RMB output at constant price. N stands for the number of rms. Note: the unit is 1000 RMB/ton sce. 
(8) Note: the dependent variable is log of energy intensity; Pe is log of energy price, which is calculated as the average energy price at the 3-digit industrial and provincial level. NonSOE is the dummy variable for domestic non-SOEs, and Foreign is the dummy variable for foreign-funded rms. All coecients are estimated through OLS. In the column "Full sample", the industry dummies are of 2-digit industry level, and in the rest columns the industry dummies are of 4-digit level industry, except no industry dummies in the column "Thermal", because Thermal power industry is already a 4-digit industry. Pe*Foreign is not available in "Coal Mining" and "Other Mining", due to the fact there are no foreign-funded rms in all mining industries in the sample. 
(8) Note: the dependent variable is log of energy intensity; Pe is log of energy price, which is calculated as the average energy price at the 3-digit industrial and provincial level. NonSOE is the dummy variable for domestic non-SOEs, and Foreign is the dummy variable for foreign-funded rms. All coecients are estimated through xed eects method. Pe*Foreign is not available in "Coal Mining" and "Other Mining", due to the fact there are no foreign-funded rms in all mining industries in the sample. 
(8) Note: the dependent variable is log of energy intensity, Pet is log of energy price in year t, Pe t−1 is log of energy price in year t-1, and so forth. Longer lag price terms were added, but due to insignicancy they are not reported in this table. The energy prices are calculated as the average energy price at the 3-digit industrial and provincial level. Table 10 , and the eects for foreign-funded rms are based on column (11) of Table 10 . The row "1-year" reports the contemporaneous eect of 1% increase in price on energy intensity. The row "2-year" reports the cumulative impact on energy intensity if energy price increases by 1% in two consecutive years, and so forth. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Note: the dependent variable is log energy intensity, Pet is log of current energy price, (NVFA/OVFA)t represents current vintage structure in capital, and
Lagged Pe is the moving average of lagged log energy price. Panel A report the results for SOEs, and Panel B corresponds to non-SOEs, and Panel C corresponds to foreign-funded rms. In the column (1), no lagged moving average energy price is included; in the column (2), Lagged Pe is the moving average of energy prices in the past 2 years, and so forth for the rest of columns. All regressions include year, industry and province dummies. The energy prices are calculated as the average energy price at the 3-digit industrial and provincial level. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Note: the dependent variable is log of (NVFA/OVFA)t, and Lagged Pe is moving average of lagged log energy price. In the column "2-year", Lagged Pe corresponds to moving average of log energy prices in the past 2 years, and so forth for the rest of columns. The upper Panel A reports the results from SOEs, the middle Panel B reports results from non-SOEs, and the lower Panel C corresponds to the results from foreign-funded rms. All regressions include year, industry and province dummies.
The energy prices are calculated as the average energy price at the 3-digit industrial and provincial level. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Note: in the columns labeled "Two-sector Model", the coecients are estimated from the simulated data generated by the model in which 69.8% output is produced by putty-clay investment. In the columns labeled "Data", the coecients are regressed on the actual data, they are the coecients reported in the column (4) of Table 10 . The x-axis is the number of years after the energy price shock.
